Introduction
Models of learning and experimentation typically predict that information accumulation eventually stops. This prediction contrasts with the observation that information is rep>eatedly, if not continuously, collected and used. In this paper we study the problem of information aggregation in a model of observational learning by a society of individuals acting sequentiedly in a changing environment. In this setting, new information is worth more than old information and learning either never stops, or is at least sure to resume after a long enough period of time.
The social learning model of Beinerjee [1] and Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch [2] (BHW) describes the decision problem faced by a sequence of [7] show that this result holds iff The problem of optimal experimentation in a changing environment has already been addressed by Kiefer [4] . Recently Keller and Rady [3] For n > 2 let H^= {oq, aj}"" be the space of all possible period n histories of actions chosen by the n -1 predecessors of individual n. Let /i" denote an element of /f". Let 9" = Pr {uji\h^) be the public probability belief that the state is Ui in period n conditional on the publicly observed history of actions chosen by the predecessors of individual n.
Similarly let r" = Pr {ui\h", ai) be the posterior belief that the state is ui conditioned on both the public action history /i" and the realization a^of the private signal observed by individual n. A simple application of Bayes' rule yields With £ > 0, the dynamics change drastically; however, the cascade region is unaffected by the state switching, since that event occurs only after the decision is made. When the possibility that the state of the world has changed in the meantime is accounted for, the public prior belief of individual n + 1, coming after individual n who chose a" = a, according to her signal a"^= ai, satisfies Note that anyone can compute these probabilities. We will consider the case g* > a, since the other case can be treated symmetrically. The action chosen will be a* = Ci, regardless of the signal a^. The next individual k + 1 knows that a* = Oj is uninformative, and computes the public prior belief g*"*"^= (1 -e) g*+e ( 1 -g*). In general the following individual n + 1, as long as q^> a or q" < 1 -a, will update her prior belief during the cascade in the same fashion, according to the (uninformative) cascade dynamics below:
The public belief dynamics are stochastic and determined by (3.1) as long as 1 -a < q^< ct (when not in a cascade) and axe deterministic and follow (3.2) when either g" > q or g" < 1 -a (during the cascade). These dynamics are depicted in the figure.
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We claim that for small enough £, (g") converges globally to some attractor strictly above q.
The fixed points of the diff^erence equation (3.3) axe the roots of the quadratic equation
Note that /i (1) = 1 -e ajid f\ (0) = £, and one can calculate sgn/{(g") = sgn (1 -2e) and fi{q^Y "^0. For any e € (0, 1) there is only one positive root q (a, e) of the quadratic equation (3.4) . Note that q{a, 1/2) = 1/2 and q{a,e) E {e,l -e) for any a.
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